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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
-vs-

Plaintiff-Respondent,

..
..

RICHARD A. RICCI,
Defendant-Appellant

No. 18l65

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a

crimi~~l

against Richard A. Ri.cci

proceeding brought by the State of Utah'

.~charging

him with having committed the ·crime of

Burglary of a Non-dwelling in violation of Section 76-6-202,:·.utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

DISPOSITION~IN

~~-

THE LOWER COURT.

The defendant was found guilty of Burglary of a Non-dwelling

after a jury trial on November 17, 1981 in the District Court in and for
Carbon County, State of. Utah,

the Honorab le·-· . Boyd Bunne 11 presiding. -:·ffh.e

court pronounced judgment on November 17, 1981 and sentenced the defendant
to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five. years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing the judgment
rendered at the trial and a ruling remanding the cause to the trial court
for a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant··was charged with having burglarized the BEJO,
a bar on Main Street in Helper, Utah in the early morning hours of
October 11, 1981.
The testimony of witnesses called by

the.pros~cution

showed

that a Helper·c;ty Police Officer; ¥1hile making routine door checks, saw
the defendant exiting through the rear door of the BEJO at approximately
. 3:50 A.M. (T.26)

The officer and defendant engaged in a brief conversa-

tion until several other officers

arriv~d,

· ··and the defendant entered the BEJO.

at which time the officers

The officers testified that they

frisked the defendant and found a screwdriver without handle in the
defendant's right pocket (T.28), observed a trash can containing certain
items (T.31 & 32), observed the back door lock lying on the floor (T.45),
found several

v~riding

ma2hines to have been vandalized (T.48) and papers

scattered on the floor behind the bar (T.49).
The defendant was placed under arrest at the scene and then
taken to the Carbon County Sheriff's Office where he was interrogated by
Officer Charles Semken.

An incriminating statement was given by the

defendant to Officer Semken (T.90) to which defendant's counsel objected
at trial

(T.90).
The defendant testified that he was walking by the back of

the BEJO when he saw the rear door open and a light on.

He entered

the building believing that it was open for business (T.110), went to

-2-
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the front of the bar, saw the scattered papers (T. 105), turned around
and left and then met the officer who was making the door checks (R.107)
The defendant denied having conmitted the burglary (T.106) and claimed

that the papers were on the floor and the vending machines had been
vandalized before he arrived.

·.'

-3-
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POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO THE JURY
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4.
The trial court refused to give the jury defendant's requested Jury Instruction Number 4 which read as follows:
You are instructed that the entry of a person into
the building of another is not unlawful if the person
reasonably oelieves that the business in the building
is open to the general public at the time he enters.
11

11

The testimony of the defendant at trial shows that he
reasonably believed the BEJO to be open to the public at the time he
entered the. door:
Q: Did you have to force the door open at the time
you went in?
A: No. It was open.
Q: At the time that you went in did you notice whether the
bar was open or closed?
A: I thought it was open.
Q: Why did you think it was open?
A: I saw lights and the door was open.
(Transcript at p. 110)
The defendant's testimony showed that his expressed intent
in going to the BEJO was to get a drink, (T.104) not to commit a crime.
(T.111)
The issue then becomes one of whether the defendant's upon
the BEJO property was unlawful even when his testimony showed he thought
the premises were open to the public.

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Section 76-6-201(3) defines "enters or remains unlawfully"
as used in the definition of Burglary as follows:
"(3) A person "enters or rema.jns unlawfully" in or upon
premises when the premises or any portion . thereof at the
time of the entry or remaining are not open to the~u~lic
and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or·pr1v1ledged
to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof."
Utah law does not define the phrase "open to the public" as used in
the above- definition.

However, the State of Oregon has a burglary

statute similar in wording to that of Utah ·s and defines ''open to the
1

pu bl i c 11 as :

premises.which by their physical nature function,
custom, usage, notice or lack thereof or other circumstances at the time would cause a reasonable person to
believe that no··permission to enter or remain is required."
(ORS 164.205(4))
11

, In State v. Taylor, 522 P.2d 499 (1974 Oregon) the defendant
was arrested in the laundry room of an apartment complex.

He testified

that he was driving through the City of Eugene when he saw the apartment complex and stopped, thinking he could do his laundry.

He tried

its closed door, found it to be unlocked, and then entered.

His defense

to the burglary·charge was that his entry into the laundry room was not
unlawful because that room was open to the public.
Although the Court in Taylor was concerned with whether an
instruction on a lesser included offense should have been given, the
following statement of the Court is significant:
"Eviden-c: i~dicating that the laundry room was open to
t~e public 1nc~u~ed the fact that it was not locked, that
lights were shining outside the apartment build.
d
tha~ there w~s no sign outside the laundry faci~~f • ~nd.
eating that it was limited to private
Th i Y in ,_
contrary evidence: no si ns or li
~se:
.ere was also
was open to the public--gor even i~t~ ~~dicat1ng the laundry
no lights on inside the laundry roo~ the roo~ was a laundry,
to 4 a.m.' and a sign inside the la 'd e ear Y ho~r - 3
un ry room stating the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hours were 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. Resolution of this conflicting
evidence was properly for the jury. However, it would have
been quite rational for the jury to conclude that this evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
laundry facility was not open to the public. Defendant's
requested instruction on theft should have been given.
(522 P.2d at 501) (underlining added.)
Defendant's requested instruction in the instant case was an
attempt to provide the .,iury with an opportunity to consider the defendant's contention that he did not unlawfully enter or remain on the
premises and therefore committed no burglary.
The instruction was justified since it hannonized with the
evidence presented by the defendant and was consistent with his theory
of defense.
The Oregon statute defining the phrase uopen to the public"
wisely contemplated factual situations in which one might enter upon
business property reasonably believing the same to be open, when the
management had intended that it be considered closed.

Surely the Utah

Legislature, by failing to define "open to the public" cannot have
intended the opposite to be the law of this state, e.g., that any entry
upon property, regardless of the appearance of the business, is
lawful if the management had intended that it be closed.
b~siness

un-

Since a

such as the BEJO encourages patrons to come upon its premises

it ought to bear the burden of its appearance and be bound by the impression it creates on potential customers.

Even though an invitation

was not intended by the management, it would seem to be reasonable to
conclude that the BEJO in this instance was extending an invitation to
business visitors to enter upon its premises if the door was open and
the lights were on at the time the defendant entered.

This assertion

is supportable also by the Oregon definition of "open to the public"
-6-
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since the

11

premises ... by their physical nature, fu~ction, usage ... at

the time would cause a· reasonable person to believe that no permission
to enter or remian is required

11

(ORS 164.205(4))

The defendant was

entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury.
By failing to give defendant's requested· instruction No.4,
the Trial Court erroneously prevented the possible determination by
the jury that the entry of the defendant was lawful and that therefore
no burglary occurred.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION
TO AMEND THE INFORMATION.
After both sides had rested and exceptions to the jury
instructions had been taken the State

~oved

to·amend·the charging part of

the information by adding the phrase"or remained in" so that the
Information finally read as follows (T.119-120):
"That the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid
unlawfully entered or remained in the building of another
with the intent to commit a theft, to-wit: the Be-Jo Club"
The defendant objected to the Motion (T.120) but the Court
permitted the amendment, stating that the defendant would not be
prejudiced.(T.120).
Section 77-35-4, Utah Code Annotated, permits an amendment
to an information to be made on the following conditions:
The court may permit an indictment or information to be
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or
differenct offense is charged and the substantial rights
of the defendant are not prejudiced.
-7-
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0The defendant contends that his substantial rights were
prejudiced by the amendment.

The defendant had prepared his case by

preparations designed to show that his entry onto the BEJO premises
was

not unlawful.

The ·nformation on which the defendant relied

throughout the-trial claimed only that the defendant entered the
premises unlawfully unlawfully.

it did not assert that the defendant remained
11

11

Consequently, the···testimony elicited by defense:counsel

from the defendant in cross-examination was primarily aimed at showing the defendant thought. the .._BEJO was open at the time of entry. Had
counsel known at the commencement of trial that the prosecution would
attempt to show and claim an unlawful remaining, defense counsel

could-~

have and would have framed questions relating to the "unlawful remaining 11 •
The motion was.also untimely for the reason that defendant s.
1

requested jury instruction had already been submitted to. the Court by
defendant.

The defendant had no opportunity to prepare any instruction

which would attempt to help· the jury determine whether an unlawful remaining had occurred.
In State v.Rohletter 160 P.2d

963(U~ah

1945) and in State v.

Ri-cken,berg, 58 Utah 270, 198 P. 767, the Utah Supreme Court held that
under the then existing Utah statute,
" ... no amendment could be made which would essentially
alter the nature of the case, so as to prejudice the
defendant in making·his defense. 11 (160 P.2d at 964)
Although the Court in

Ro~J_e_tter,supra,

was considering the

situation where an information charging rape was amended to add a count
charging the crime of carnal knowledge, the reasoning of the court in
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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reversing the conviction is applicable in the case at bar:
The defendant sought throughout his c~ass-examination to
show that the plaintiff .had consented to the sexual actwhich would ·have defeated the charge of rape.but would ~ot
have been a defense to the charge of carnal knowledge.
We cannot assume that the same jury would have bee~ selected,
the,same questions asked, th~ s~me evide~ce emphasized, had
the information from·the beg1nn1ng contained both counts.
The addition of the second count charging a new and separate
offense at this stage of the proceeding was prejudicial.
The judgment is r~versed and the matter remanded for
further proceedings. W-

1

':.•.

In the Rohletter case, defense counsel concentrated on
issue of consent.

It appears that consent was only element distinguish11

11

ing rape and carnal knowledge from each other.
addition of the

th~

ph~ase·

11

or

In the instant case the

remained in" was as significant and

pr~.judicial

to defendant as was the addition of the carnal knowledge count in Rohlettersignificant because defendant was not placed on notice at any time throughout the trial that he would need to defend
that he unlawfully- remai·ned on· the premises.

himself against a claim
Each step of the trial and_

preliminary ,hearing proceeded in the light -Of ·an information charg·ing
that defendant had unlawfully entered and not mentioning unlawfully remaining.
The amendment allowed the jury. the possibility of findin_g that
the defendant did not "enter unlawfully" but that he unlawfully re11

mained''.

The action of the trial court in granting the motion to amend

was prejudicial by failing to timely place the defendant on notice that
he would have to defend
ment.

against'the allegation contained in the amend-

The defendant was thus deprived of his right "to be informed of

the nature and cause of the;actusation'' in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in violation of
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the due process clause of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution of the United States.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 4.
Instruction Number 4, as given by the Court read as follows:
Before you can convict the defendant of burglary, as charged
in the Information, you must find beyond a reasonable
doubt the following elements:
1. That the defendant, on or about October 11,1981,
unlawfully entered or remained in a building of another;
2. That at ·the time of such entry or unlawfully remaining he had the intent to commit a theft.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each of these
essential elements of the offense of burglary beyond a
reasonable doubt it is your duty to convict the defendant
of the crime of burglary as stated in the Information.
If the evidence has failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt one or more of the said elements, then you should find
the defendant not guilty of the crime of burglary as charged
in the Information.
(Record at 31)
The defendant excepted to the instruction upon the grounds
that the phrase 11 or remained" should not have been included in the
instruction. (T. 119)

The exception finds its basis in defendant's

claim that the original information did not charge the defendant with
"unlawfully remaining".

Defendant herein incorporates the argument and

reasoning set forth in Point II as the balance of the argument for this
Point III.

-10-
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE CONTENTS OF A WASTE
CAN INTO EVIDENCE
On motion of the prosecution the Trial Court admitted into
evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit No.3 which purported to be a yellow~trash
bucket containing numerous small ·items. (T.58-59)

Defendant 1 s objec-

tion to the admission of the collective contents on the ground of
. i nsuffi ci ent foundation was overruled. ·(T .··59)
In Carter v. State, 446 P. 2d 165 (Nevada 1969) .the Supreme.
Court of Nevada set forth the standard to be met by a party seeking
to admit physical evidence:
"The statement that the exhibit is the identical
object or reasonably resembles it~and that it is
. in the same condition as at the time the offense
occurred makes the exhibit admissible."
The testimony of the officer stated that the contents of
the can were the identical objects as set forth in the inventory.
But the second requirement of the test set forth in Carter was not met,
i.e., the officer did not testify that the contents of the waste basket
we-re in the same condition as at the . . time the offense occurred.
Defendant also objects to the collective admission of the
contents in order td prevent any

items~being.

admitted into evidence

which may not havei been i ndi. vi dually described on the inventory prepared by the officer.

The inventory was prepared by the officer

shortly after the contents were seized in the BEJO.(T.32)
there was no testimony to show

that~the

However,

officer had reviewed the

contents prior to trial to detennine whether the contents corresponded
to the inventory·taken at the time of their

seizure~

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant submits that the better procedure would have
been for each item in the waste can to have been individually marked
and identified so as to prevent any item from being included as part
of the exhibit when it may not have .been listed on the inventory.
There is now no way in which any reviewing court can determine whether
the items in the. waste basket were the same items presented for
admission at trial.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING OFFICER CHARLES SEMKEN TO
TESTIFY TO A STATEMENT MADE TO HIM BY THE DEFENDANT.
Over objection of counsel, Deputy Charles Semken testified
to an incriminating statement made to him by the defendant shortly
after the arrest.(T.90-91)

The defendant acknowledges that his

"Miranda Rights" were given to him priO'r to the statement but denies
·that he waived them.(T.90)
There can be no doubt that the statement of the defendant
was extremely damaging to him and constitutes reversible error if
improperly admitted.
A review of the record shows that the defendant was told
of his rights and then the following dialogue occurred:
arid I asked him if he understood those things.
And he said, yes, he did.
11

•••

Q. Then what happened?

A. I asked him what happen· over in Helper.
said, I got caught.
(T.90)
11

He

11

The transcript as set forth above shows that there was no
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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express waiver -- the defendant merely affirmed that he-understood
those rights.

The issue presented is whether waiver can be implied

by reason of the fact that the defendant responded to the questioning
by Deputy Semken.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 346,
16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, clearly defined the principles that
govern once the required warnings have been given:
"If the interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney·and a statement is taken, a heavy burden
rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel ... This Court has always set high standards of
proof for the waiver of constitutional rights ... , and we
re-assert these standards as applied to jn-custody
interrogation. Since the State is .responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the
interrogation takes place and has the only means of
making available corroborated evidence of warnings given
during incommunicado interrogation, (444 US 471) the
16 L.Ed2d at 724
burden is rightly on its shoulders."
Applying the test set forth in Miranda it is clear that the
burden is on the State to demonstrate waiver

~

it is not required of

the defendant to show that he did not waive his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to appointed counsel.
i~Carnle,Yv.

Even prior to Miranda

Cochran, 369 US 506, 8 L.Ed 2d 70, 82 S.Ct.884 (1962) the

U.S. Supreme Court stated:
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.
The record must show, or there must be an allegation and
evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel
but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
Anything less is not waiver." 8 L.Ed. 2d 77
11

Although the "warning was given to the defendant the
transcript is void of any evidence which would show that the defendant
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 60 L.Ed 2d 286,
99 S.Ct. 1755 (1980) the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court may find
an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations ·
where the defendant did not expressly state as much:
[lb] An express written or oral statement of waiver of
the right to remain silent or of the right to· counsel
is usually strong proof of the validity of that wa.iver,
but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient
to establish waiver. The question is not-one of form,
but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and
voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda·
case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere
silence is not enough. That does not mean that the
defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of
his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver,
may never support a conclusion that a defendant has
waived his rights. The courts must presume that a
defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's
burden is great;but in at least some cases waiver can
be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the
person interrogated.
Defendant submits that his actions and words did not constitute
a waiver of his rights.

The prosecution's burden requires that more

care be taken than in this situation where the defendant was given
his warnings, asked if he understood those rights, and then questioned
with regard to the incident.

No good faith effort was made to determine

whether the defendant wanted an attorney present or whether he wanted
to make a statement.
Where the record fails to reveal that the defendant made an
intelligent waiver the court under the principle of Butler, supra,
"must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights ... 11 (60 L.Ed 2d. 286

-14-
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing points, the Appellant

~·c

respectfully submits that the judgment rendered at trial be reversed
and the cause remanded to the trial court for the purpose of a new
trial.

Respectfully submitted,

RYCE
Attor e for Appellant
690 E t Main Street
P.O. Box 444
Price, Utah 84501

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, BRYCE K. BRYNER, hereby certify that I personally served
two (2) copies of the above and foregoin9BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon
DAVID WILKINSON, Attorney General of the State of Utah, by delivering
s~id

copies to the Office of the Attorney General at 236 State Capitol,

Salt Lake City, Utah

this 17th day of May, 1982.
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